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THE UNION WORKPLACE MEETS BIG BROTHER:
ADVISING CLIENTS ON EMPLOYER CONDUCT WITH
REGARD TO HIDDEN SURVEILLANCE
By Jamila Asha Johnson1
© 2006 Jamila Asha Johnson
Abstract
Hidden cameras may guide a union employer to find
employee misconduct, but at what cost?  Since the late
1990s, two federal appeals courts and the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) have required employers to bargain
with unions before using hidden video surveillance to
observe employees.   Until more recently, however, it was
less apparent how lawyers should advise clients when an
employer wished to use hidden cameras or had already
installed non-disclosed video surveillance. In August 2005,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case surrounding
surveillance at an Anheuser-Busch facility, which provided
further guidance on these issues.  This Article analyzes the
Anheuser-Bush decision and clarifies the scope of what
might happen to an employer who fails to bargain and that
subsequently takes actions based on hidden camera
technology. It also addresses how an employer can discuss
hidden cameras with a union without undermining the
benefits of such technology.
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<1> In the United States, 51 percent of companies use video
surveillance according to the 2005 Electronic Monitoring and
Surveillance Survey conducted by the American Management
Association and The E-Policy Institute. This figure increased
from 2001, where only 33 percent of companies practiced such
behavior.2  However, while many companies value hidden
cameras, not everyone sees the technology as a benefit.
Employees and unions tend to perceive hidden surveillance
devices as invasive of employee privacy.3  Two United States
federal legislative proposals — the first in 1970 — requiring
notice of monitoring have failed.4  While no federal statute
prohibits surveillance in the classic workplace, the United States
does regulate surveillance in union workplaces via the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).5  The NLRB enforces the NLRA and
requires employers to bargain with unions for the right to use
hidden surveillance.6
<2> In June of 1998, Anheuser-Busch installed hidden
surveillance cameras to monitor an area where employees
occasionally worked and took breaks, without giving the union
notice of the surveillance.7  Anheuser-Busch found sixteen
employees engaging in misconduct during the month it recorded
footage. The hidden cameras produced images of workers
urinating on company property, smoking marijuana, and taking
extended breaks.8  The corporation informed the union, then
fired, suspended, or warned the employees. Seven years later,
in 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
Anheuser-Busch’s use of hidden cameras was a mandatory
subject of union bargaining and that the NLRB had poorly
justified its decision to not force the company to engage in
make-whole relief.9
<3> In the Anheuser-Busch case, this relief may ultimately
include back pay (less any pay the workers earned elsewhere
while fired) and possibly re-instatement based on the decision
of the NLRB.10  As the recent D.C. Circuit opinion in Anheuser-
Busch suggests, electronic investigations into employee
misconduct must be handled delicately. The case also provides
helpful suggestions for how lawyers representing employers and
unions should handle the issue of hidden surveillance.
UNDERSTANDING THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
<4> Federal wiretap laws, state statutes, and judicial rulings
heavily regulate an employer’s ability to secretly record oral
communications.11  However, few restrictions prevent an
employer from secretly installing video cameras in the workplace 2
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to monitor employee behavior when no sound is recorded or to
use video footage to conduct investigations. The only substantial
federal restrictions arose from a series of NLRB decisions that
interpreted the NLRA to require employers to bargain with
unions before installing and using hidden cameras in the
workplace.
<5> The NLRA strives, in part, to create a society where
organized employees engage in conversations with employers
regarding job security and the conditions of employment.12  The
structured discussion between employers and unions is called
collective bargaining.13  While collective bargaining is a popular
term in the media, it can create misconceptions for a
professional that seldom handles labor law. Collective bargaining
addresses two types of subjects — mandatory subjects of
bargaining and permissive subjects. With mandatory subjects,
collective bargaining does not require that the employer and the
workers come to an agreement — the parties must only bargain
until they reach an agreement or an “impasse”.14  An impasse
occurs when it is clear that no further progress is expected on
an issue. With permissive subjects of bargaining there is no
requirement to even reach an impasse.15
<6> It is also important to note that if a contract is already in
place, the union may be limited in its recourse against an
employer that unilaterally implements a hidden camera
surveillance program.16  Collective bargaining agreements often
include provisions that require a union to arbitrate disputes that
arise after a contract is in place and include catch-all provisions
that may include an employer’s right to implement means of
investigating worker misconduct. In these situations the union is
limited in the legal action it may bring against an employer.
<7> There are two advantages that come with engaging in
collective bargaining about the use of hidden cameras. First,
information from the bargaining process is often transmitted to
workers. Workers may therefore be on notice that their behavior
may be monitored. Workers may choose to modify their
behavior after bargaining begins to avoid possible termination or
lesser sanctions. Second, collective bargaining gives the union a
chance to argue against the implementation of hidden
surveillance or to try and set the terms of the surveillance
(under what circumstances surveillance can be used in
investigations, whether surveillance footage can be the only
proof required for termination, etc.). But it is important to
remember that an employer is never required to compromise as
long as it engages in good-faith bargaining.
<8> The United States Supreme Court has held that mandatory 3
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subjects of bargaining are matters that are, “plainly germane to
the ‘working environment’ and ‘not among those managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control’” that
are exempt from the duty to bargain.17  Lie detectors and drug
testing policies,18  which are integral parts of employers
investigations, are deemed mandatory subjects for collective
bargaining. In 1997, the NLRB in its Colgate-Palmolive decision,
added hidden cameras to the growing list of mandatory
subjects.19  The employer in Colgate-Palmolive installed cameras
in its facility and also in the air vent of the men’s restrooms.20
The Board found that use of surveillance cameras was not
fundamental to the basic direction of an enterprise and
impinged directly on employment security.21  However, the
ruling did not prevent the employer from using hidden
surveillance after engaging in collective bargaining on the
issue.22
<9> The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued the
second major decision relating to video surveillance and
bargaining. In National Steel Corporation v. NLRB, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the decisions of the NLRB establishing employee
surveillance as a mandatory subject of bargaining.23  The case
involved a National Steel facility where, in addition to 100 plain-
view cameras, the corporation periodically used hidden cameras
in investigations against employees. One such investigation
involved a camera in a manager’s file cabinet placed to catch
employees making long-distance calls after hours. In February
of 1999, National Steel discharged an employee who filed a
union grievance. The court wholly supported the decision of the
NLRB and reiterated the risks to employee job security when
such investigations take place and ordered that the company
engage in collective bargaining as to whether the company
could use hidden surveillance.24
<10> In the summer of 2005, the D.C. Circuit decided another
case involving hidden cameras. Anheuser-Busch caught its
employees breaking the law. The company caught a man
urinating off a roof. It had proof of employees taking drugs.
According to the severity of the behavior the company
disciplined employees by firing, suspending or adding the
incident to personnel files. Yet, the NLRB had said Anheuser-
Busch failed to bargain and thus was in the wrong. After this
decision both the company and the union were displeased with
the ruling. Anheuser-Busch disagreed with the Board finding
fault with its actions.25  The corporation maintained that it
merely recorded people performing not only inappropriate acts,
but illegal acts.
4
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<11> While the NLRB ruling affirmed that the corporation had
committed a wrongful act; the Board did not require make-
whole relief, such as reinstatement or monetary compensation
for employees, to the dismay of the Union.26  The NLRB pointed
to 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) and stated that, “no order of the Board
shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee
who has been suspended or discharged for cause.”27  In
essence, the NLRB agreed that because the cameras revealed
employees engaged in illegal acts, Anheuser Busch could
properly discharge them. However, the company would have to
bargain for future use of hidden video surveillance.
<12> The D.C. Circuit, in contrast, found that the NLRB had not
adequately distinguished precedent suggesting that in situations
where job security is at risk from investigative tools (such as
polygraphs) that reinstatement could still be an option.28  In
situations where an employer terminates a union employee with
information it has gathered through a means that should be, but
was not, bargained for in the collective bargaining agreement,
the NLRB has required that the employer put the employees
back in the position they were in prior to the action based on
this information.29  It upheld the finding of fault and remanded
for a new judgment or directed the Board to overrule its past
precedent. Nevertheless, the court continued to give full support
for the interpretation of the NLRA requiring employers to
bargain with unions for hidden surveillance.
HOW TO BARGAIN WITH A UNION ABOUT HIDDEN VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE
<13> In 2003, when National Steel Corporation went before the
Seventh Circuit, it argued that mandatory bargaining for hidden
surveillance violated public policy.30  The company argued that
hidden cameras would be of no value to employers if employees
were made aware that the cameras were in use. National Steel
Corporation insisted that the bargaining destroyed the necessary
layer of secrecy required to meaningfully use the technology. If
concealment was compromised the technology would fail to
produce results — especially if the company must disclose the
location of cameras.31
<14> Anheuser-Busch also argued before the D.C. Circuit that
the NLRB’s requirement of bargaining was unworkable since it
would require “instance-by-instance” bargaining.32  The
company feared that every union workplace would be forced to
run to the union each time it suspected employee or third-party
misconduct. It insisted that going to the union representatives
5
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with every investigation would be cumbersome and undercut the
timeliness of investigations while exposing a practice predicated
upon secrecy.33  Both the Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuits
rejected these arguments.
<15> The D.C. Circuit held that the NLRB left practical and
sensible room for employers to meet the general requirements
for bargaining without forcing employers to consult with the
union on each investigation.34  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
found that the NLRB did not specify that the locations of each
camera be disclosed, thus the National Steel Corporation had
enough secrecy to veil its investigations.35
<16> In practical terms, however, employers may wonder what
autonomy they retain with respect to deployment of hidden
cameras in light of the National Steel and Anheuser Busch
cases? In previous cases where the NLRB has told employers to
bargain with the union, the NLRB’s administrative order decision
did not delve into specifics. Rather the Board requested that
employers and unions engage in good faith bargaining to either
reach an agreement where both parties accommodate the risks
and benefits of the technology and its impact upon employees
or to reach an impasse.36  Bargaining in good faith also includes
the responsibility to supply union representatives with
information relevant to the collective bargaining process.37
<17> The National Steel and Anheuser-Busch cases do provide
helpful suggestions for lawyers advising clients. For one,
employers can always return to overt camera usage. The NLRB
has suggested that employers are free to use overt video
surveillance to further its goals without reaching a collective
bargaining agreement so long as it is not used in manner with a
tendency to coerce, interfere or restrain employee job security
or protected concerted union activity.38  Hidden surveillance,
however, is believed to innately restrain job security and is
never to be used without bargaining with a union.39
<18> Based on the Anheuser-Busch case, employers can expect
to bargain on several non-exclusive elements of hidden
surveillance. For example, when an employer bargains over
hidden cameras, its negotiations may include the purposes for
surveillance and the general buildings or types of work areas
where hidden surveillance may be used.40  An employer and
union representatives may also bargain over whether hidden
cameras can ever be used in the workplace.41
<19> In the event that an employer cannot come to an
agreement with unions on hidden video surveillance, but does
not want the issue to cause a wedge in other subjects of 6
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bargaining, cameras are not the only way that a company can
investigate employee misconduct. A company may use private
investigators to uncover such misconduct. Installing directly
visible cameras may also be a solution. As mentioned above, an
employer and a union may bargain over the general areas in
which hidden cameras may be used.42  This does not, however,
suggest that the employer must disclose each location. Instead
an employer may bargain with the union to install cameras in
certain types of work areas without detracting from the secrecy
of the precise location.43
<20> Another possible issue that can be bargained over is the
level of suspicion that must be held by the employer before
hidden cameras are utilized.44  Such an agreement does not
jeopardize the investigative value of hidden cameras since the
specifics of location are not at disclosed. While perhaps
cumbersome, its results may eliminate disputes with a union
whose membership fears hidden cameras being installed without
cause. During the bargaining process, employers can also agree
not to use cameras as a sole basis for disciplining employees as
another way to preserve the efficacy of using hidden
cameras.45  In such a situation an employer would agree to
investigate further if the hidden cameras revealed suggestions of
employee misconduct and find additional means to discipline
such misconduct.
<21> Perhaps an equally contentious issue for employers is the
question of when to approach the union, and with what
preliminary information. This is especially true if a lawyer learns
that the client has not yet disclosed the use of hidden cameras
to its union employees. Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the NLRA
mandate that the duty to bargain in good faith also includes a
duty to provide the union with information that is relevant to
the bargaining.46  Employers can violate the act not only by
failing to bargain, but also by refusing to provide relevant
information in a timely manner.47  Anheuser-Bush neglected to
provide information about other cameras, as the union
requested, until six months after the request was made.48
Lawyers should advise employer clients to respond in a timely
manner to requests regarding hidden surveillance by providing
information on their use.
MINIMIZING THE EFFECTS OF FAILING TO BARGAIN WHEN CAMERAS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN INSTALLED
<22> The Anheuser-Busch case creates additional incentive for
employers to bargain, or at the very least to try and minimize
7
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damages if the Board determines that the employer should have
bargained on the subject before disciplining employees. When
the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB, it did so only
on the issue of make-whole relief.49  The Court found that
nothing within 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) requires the Board to deny
make-whole relief when an employer discovers employees’
misconduct only through its own unlawful action.50
<23> The D.C. Circuit cited Tocco, Inc. to show that the NLRB
has found make-whole relief appropriate in cases where an
employer had changed its drug testing policy. 51  In Tocco, the
NLRB found make-whole relief appropriate where an employer
had fired an employee after changing the drug testing policy
without bargaining with the union for the change.52  Like
changes in drug testing policy, changing a means of surveillance
significantly threatens job security. Employees who know that
their drug use will be tested would refrain from use. An
employee who is aware of the possibility of hidden surveillance
will behave in a more appropriate manner while on breaks. The
Anheuser-Busch court called for make-whole relief on remand or
for the NLRB to overrule its line of drug test cases and
polygraph cases.53
<24> For labor lawyers, this decision should be a strong
indication of the possible sanction for a failure to bargain. It is
impossible for management at Anheuser-Busch to overlook a
worker who urinated from their roof. It is even harder to
overlook individuals who used illegal drugs on the company’s (or
corporation) property. If an employer has installed hidden
surveillance, but has yet to review the footage, the most
prudent course may be to not view the recordings.
<25> If an employer has bargained with the union for hidden
cameras, but is using them in a way that is inconsistent with
the collective bargaining agreement, the employer could still be
violating the NLRA. It is best to always keep good records
during investigations to show that even without the surveillance
footage the company knew of the misconduct. If a union
successfully challenges the location of the camera, such
documentation may be the only safeguard preventing a
judgment for make-whole relief.
CONCLUSION
<26> Most employers can use hidden surveillance in the
workplace without repercussion. Recent court decisions have
begun to make clear the duties of employers of union
employees with respect to video surveillance. Attorneys advising
8
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol3/iss1/2
The Union Workplace Meets Big Brother: Advising clients on employer conduct with regard to hidden surveillance >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Techn...
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol3/a002Johnson.html[3/23/2010 9:08:16 AM]
union employers should be aware of the limitations on the use
of hidden surveillance cameras.
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